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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050190-CA
v.
DEBORAH WALLACE,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a refusal to bind over on a charge of issuing a bad check, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004), in the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Steven
L. Hansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1999) and State
v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION,
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the magistrate incorrectly refused to bind over a charge of issuing a bad
check where evidence amply showed that defendant knew the check would not be paid?
Preservation'. This issue was preserved by the magistrate's order dismissing the
charges. R. 191-88. (A copy of the Order is contained in Addendum C.)

Standard of Review: "[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over
for trial presents a question of law," State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,429 (Utah App. 1997),
which is reviewed "without deference to the court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8,
20P.3d300.
STATUTES
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 76-20-11
§ 76-2-103
§ 76-6-505
§ 76-6-505

(1953, as amended);
(West 2004);
(1973);
(West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with issuing a bad check, a second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) (West 2004) (counts 1 and 2)
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-101801 (West 2004) (counts 3 and 4), and pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1603 (West 2004) (count 5). R4-1.1 Her husband,
George Wallace, was also charged with associated offenses (counts 6-11). Id. A preliminary
hearing was held before the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, acting as a magistrate under rule
7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the magistrate took the matter of bindover on all
charges under advisement. R58-57; 196:81-83. Defendant moved to dismiss all counts.
Rl07-99. Following a hearing, the magistrate issued a memorandum decision wherein it
1

The magistrate's dismissal of charges against George Wallace is the subject of a
separate State's appeal, case number 20050192-CA.
3

concluded that the State had failed to establish every element of each of the charged offenses.
R139; 150-141 "Memorandum Decision" (Addendum B); R198, transcript of October 19,
2004 hearing on defendant's motion ("dismissal hearing"). The prosecutor moved the
magistrate to reconsider. Rl 66-152. The magistrate issued a second memorandum decision
wherein it concluded the State had not presented any argument to modify the magistrate's
prior decision. R186. On January 31, 2005, the magistrate issued its order dismissing all
charges. R191-188 ("Order") (Addendum C). The State timely filed a notice of appeal on
February 24, 2005. R193.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In two and one-halfyears defendant and her husband wrote 254 checks on
twelve bank accounts, aggregating to more than $450,000
Count 2 - Issuing a Bad Check - Deborah Wallace
Count 7- Theft by Deception - George Wallace2
On the morning of July 18, 2002, defendant called Sharon Warner at her home in
Springville, from which she worked for Morris Murdock Travel ("Morris Murdock").
R196:46-48. Defendant asked Ms. Warner to get her eleven tickets for flights the next day
to Hawaii. Rl 96:47. In response to Ms. Warner's surprise about the late call, defendant said
she had already made arrangements with Pleasant Hawaii Holidays. However, she did not
have a credit card, and because of the last-minute arrangements, Ms. Warner, "with Morris
2

Facts related to charges against George Wallace (count's 6-11) are set out as
they are generally the same facts supporting defendant's charges. The State intends to
move to consolidate the Wallaces' cases. Facts supporting counts 1 and 3 through 11 are
relevant to this State's appeal of the magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over on count
2 and are set out accordingly.
4

behind [her], would have the clout" to expedite the ticket arrangement. She also explained
that she wanted Ms. Warner to receive the commission, about $1500. Rl96)47-48. Ms.
Warner, with Morris's vice president's approval, agreed, and asked for cash. R196:48.
Defendant said she did not have the money at that point, but that she would on Tuesday. Id.
Defendant then requested that Ms. Warner take a check and post-date it to the coming
Tuesday. Id. Early that afternoon, both defendant and George Wallace delivered a check for
$11,496.30, andthankedMs. Warner with a "big hug." R196:49. The Wallaces left the next
day. R196:52.
Although the check was actually dated "July 17," Ms. Warner did not try to cash it
until Tuesday. Rl96:49. When she called the bank, she learned that there were insufficient
funds to cover the check. Id. Ms. Warner waited another day or two and then called
defendant on her cell phone in Hawaii. Rl96:49-50. When Ms. Warner expressed her
concern, defendant said, "Oh, the money is coming any time. Just hold off a few more days."
Rl 96:50. Ms. Warner reported, "This went on for several weeks" and always with the same
refrain: "[S]ome money is coming... and it was always a big amount... that would cover
this." R196:50-51. She usually spoke with defendant. Id. At some point, Ms. Warner
deposited the check, and it was returned for insufficient funds. R196:50.
Lynette Ambrose, a paralegal in Morris Murdock's legal department, spoke frequently
with defendant in trying to collect on the check. R196:53-54. Most of her telephone
conversations were also with defendant. Rl96:54. The Wallaces also made out two more
checks, totaling $1,860, to Morris Meetings, a subsidiary of Morris Murdock, for admission
5

fees to a Nu Skin convention. Id. Both of those checks "bounced." Id. At the time of the
preliminary hearing, the Wallaces still owed Morris Murdock $14,196.30. Id.
Mr. O'Bryant testified that the check to Morris Murdock was written on a different
Far West account owned by Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC, a similar sounding account to
Imi Kaimana Investments. R196:13-14. That check was for $11,496.30. Id. There was
never enough money in that account to cover the check "[b]y a large margin—[tjhousands
of dollars." R196:15.
Defendant's conduct in issuing an insufficient funds check with a promise to repay
in the near future described a regular, long-standing pattern of defendant and her husband
with numerous other victims. Accordingly, the facts giving rise to the other dismissed
charges against both defendants are set out accordingly. At the preliminary hearing, Toby
O'Bryant, an investigator who had investigated about a hundred white-collar crimes,
presented an overview of the prosecution's case. R196:5-27. He testified that on November
4,2002, he met with eight individuals who had been "relieved of some money in one fashion
or another [by the Wallaces], some by insufficient funds checks, some by borrowing the
money and not paying it back as promised." R196:5-8. These and other individuals and
business entities claimed the Wallaces owed them more than $450,000. R196:8,10; State's
Ex. 3. Mr. O'Bryant subpoenaed fourteen bank accounts and looked at twelve of them.
R196:9. Except for one of those accounts, all existed for only a year or two. Id. The
Wallaces accumulated "a number of returned checks, overdraft and bank fees, and left
deficits in closing amounts when [the accounts] were terminated by the banks." Id. The
6

accounts were terminated involuntarily. Rl 96:10. Between January 2000 and July 2002, the
Wallaces wrote from those accounts 254 checks that were returned for insufficient funds.
R196:9-10.
Count I - Issuing a Bad Check - Deborah Wallace
Count 6 - Theft by Deception - George Wallace
Edward Martinez had known the Wallaces, as neighbors in Springville, for six or
seven years at the time of the preliminary hearing. George Wallace had also represented Mr.
Martinez in a custody matter concerning Mr. Martinez's father. R196:33-34. Shortly after
that matter was concluded, Wallace asked if Mr. Martinez would lend him $10,000 for an
investment Wallace was working on. Rl 96:34. On July 2,2001, Mr. Martinez and his fatherin-law, Donald Horton, met with Wallace at Wallace's home, and they each loaned him
$10,000. R196:34-36. The note for the 90-day, twelve-percent (12%) loan required Wallace
to repay the principal, plus approximately $2,450, by September 30, 2001. R196:36. Mr.
Martinez received a promissory note and a pledge agreement in support of the transaction.
Id. He also received a modified promissory note, directing Wallace to pay an additional
thirty percent (30%) if the note was not paid by February 2002. Rl 96:36-37. Mr. Martinez
trusted Wallace out of defendant's earlier association with him. R196:34.
Wallace did not repay the loan by September 30. R196:37. When Mr. Martinez and
Mr. Horton inquired about their money, Wallace said that he had a '"big deal' ready to come
through this Tuesday or Wednesday," at which point the Wallaces would have their money.
Id. Wallace also asked Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton to extend the loan, but they declined.

7

R196:37-38. Although the day of the alleged "big deal" came and went, Wallace failed to
pay the loans. R196:38. At first, Mr. Martinez called the Wallaces on behalf of himself and
Mr. Horton every other week, and later, every week. Id. Each time they received the same
familiar refrain: We have a "big deal" coming through and "[w]e should have your money
for you by this next Tuesday or Wednesday." Id. But each time, Wednesday came and went
without payment. Id.
On December 4, 2001, Mr. Martinez received a $10,000 check from the Wallaces.
Id. He was still owed interest of $3,306.24. R196:38-39.
On July 17, 2002, after trying to get the rest of their money back, the Martinezes and
the Hortons happened to drive by the Wallaces' residence. Rl96:40. There they saw a
moving van, an overseas or overland shipping container, and people moving furniture. Id.
Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton entered the house and asked the Wallaces what they were
doing. Rl96:40-41. The Wallaces said they were moving to Hawaii. Rl96:41. Mr.
Martinez said he and Mr. Horton would like to get paid before the Wallaces left. Id.
Defendant said, "That won't be a problem," and she wrote a check to Mr. Martinez for
$3,000 and a check to Mr. Horton for $13,000. R196:41, 43. When Mr. Martinez noticed
the interest on his check was short, defendant wrote an additional check for $301.24.
R196:42-43. The checks were dated, "July 17,2002." Id. Defendant requested that they not
cash the checks until Tuesday or Wednesday because "[w]e should have plenty of money in
there by Tuesday or Wednesday." Rl96:41-42. Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton agreed and
did not try to cash the checks until July 22, as defendant requested. Id. On July 22, Mr.
8

Martinez called the bank and learned that none of the checks would clear the account.
Rl 96:42-43. Days later, on the advice of a police officer, Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton
deposited the checks, but only the one for $301.24 cleared the account. R196:43-44; State's
Ex. 4, Donald Horton's 1102 statement. Mr. Martinez acknowledged, on cross-examination,
that defendant had repaid three prior loans Mr. Martinez made to him. Rl 96:45.
Mr. O'Bryant testified that the $13,000 check to Mr. Horton was written on a Far
West account belonging to Imi Kaimana Investments, LLC, on which George Wallace was
the only endorser. R196:11-12. The account never had funds close to $13,000, either before
or after it was written. R196:12. The account was involuntarily closed on August 12,2002,
less than a month after the check was written. Id.
Count 4 - Communications Fraud - Deborah Wallace
Count 10 - Communications Fraud- George Wallace
In 1996, Jeanne Stonely and her husband sold their house in Springville to the
Wallaces. R196:71-72. The contract set out a schedule of gradual monthly payments: from
$1,663.78, beginning in September 1997, to $2,148.49 by August 1,2001, at which time the
Wallaces promised to pay off all principal and interest then owed. Rl96:72-73; State's Ex.
2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 statement, Ex. A and P.3
The Wallaces began to fall short on their payments in September 1997. R196:73.
After the Wallaces failed to pay anything for several months, Ms. Stonely contacted them.
Id. Because Ms. Stonely trusted the Wallaces, she constantly "fell prey" to their explanations
3

The 1102 statement of Jeanne Stonely, bearing on counts 4 and 10 (State's Ex. 2) was
received without objection. R59; 196:19-20.
9

and claims that her money would be forthcoming. Id. Eventually, the Stonelys, who were
then in Canada, sent the Wallaces a demand letter, which was never acknowledged.
Rl96:74. The Wallaces had apparently left the house, but left no forwarding address. Id.
The Stonelys, however, still had the Wallaces' cell phone number. Whenever they spoke,
either defendant or George Wallace would promise that the money was forthcoming. Id.
Because the Wallaces were short on their payments, the Stonelys could not make their
mortgage payments. Id. "The pressure was on," and the Stonelys needed to regain
possession of the house. Id. The Stonelys hired an attorney and regained possession of the
house by receiving a warranty deed from the Wallaces. R196:74-75.
The Stonelys incurred other expenses after receiving the warranty deed. Rl96:75.
The Stonelys changed the locks and engaged a realtor to sell the house. Id. The Wallaces
did not leave the house in good condition; it needed a great deal of cleaning and repairs for
wear-and-tear, costing between $700 and $800. R196:75-76. The yard needed attention, and
Ms. Stonely paid her children to take care of it. Rl 96:75. Although she was not sure that
the warranty deed explicitly addressed the matter, she and the Wallaces understood that she
would forgive the Wallaces' outstanding debt on the house if the house was left in good
condition. R196:76. She also paid $3,000 in back taxes accrued by the Wallaces over four
years. Id. Between September 1997 and April 2002, the Wallaces missed eighteen payments
entirely and where short on twenty-two payments, a deficit totaling $51,111.13. R100;
State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102 statement.

10

Count 9 - Issuing a bad check - George Wallace
The Tradewinds Estate ("Tradewinds") is owned by Mr. David Thielen, who does
business under the name of the Tradewinds by renting the estate. State's Ex. 1, 1102
statement of Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent.4 In March 2002, the Wallaces
began negotiations with Mr. Thielen to rent the Tradewinds on the island of Oahu in Hawaii.
R196:15. The Wallaces signed a rental agreement, dated June 17, 2002, to rent the estate
for $8,000 a month beginning July 1, 2002. R196:15-16; State's Ex. 1, 1102 statement of
Peggy Young, booking manager for Tradewinds. Defendant wrote a check for $8,500 to
Tradewinds to cover the initial deposit, plus a late fee, on the estate. State's Ex. 1. That
check did not clear.5 State's Ex. 1. Defendant wired $7,500 to Tradewinds and covered the
remaining deposit and late fee with another individual's credit card.6 State's Ex. 1.
Thereafter, on July 19, 2002, George Wallace wrote a check to Tradewinds for $3,096.84
to partially cover the first month's rent. State's Ex. 1. That check too, the basis for count
9, was returned for insufficient funds. R196:15, 17-19; State's Ex. 1. A rental fee of

4

The 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1) was
received without objection. R59; 196:18-19.
5

Defendant was not charged with an offense with respect to this insufficient funds

check.
6

The Wallaces were also individually charged in this case with communications
fraud against Catryna Faux and her husband based on credit advances made to the
Wallaces while the two couples were in Hawaii. R3-2; 196:55-70; State's Ex. 5. The
facts of those charges are not discussed in this brief.
11

$14,250 was still owed on the estate even after the Wallaces later wired approximately
$8,000 to Tradewinds. R196:25-26.
Prosecutorial judgment that Wallace's acted criminally
From his investigation, Mr. O'Bryant considered that the Wallaces should be charged
criminally and that their activities should not be regarded as isolated instances of a bad
checks and unfortunate circumstances that should have been handled civilly:
[T]he volume of complaint was one matter that concerned me greatly. This
wasn't just a mistake here and there, a dropped decimal point or a
miscalculation in a checkbook. This was an overall long-term pattern of
development through 12 accounts ofjuggling monies, moving one temporarily
into one to pay for something that didn't exist. There was just not enough
money in any of those accounts to do the kinds of things they were doing
financially.
R196:20. From what Mr. O'Bryant could tell from the accounts he examined, he thought
the Wallaces were living well beyond their means. Id. The Wallaces also personally
admitted to Mr. O'Bryant that a "Restitution/Victim List, was "fairly accurate." R196:3032; State's Ex. 3. The list compiled the Wallaces indebtedness to numerous persons and
entities, including victims of the charged offenses, totaling $457,379.79. State's Ex. 3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The magistrate incorrectly refused to bind defendant over on the theft by deception
charge based on defendant's issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock (Count 7). The
magistrate incorrectly read the charge to require a showing of fraudulent intent, rather than
recognizing that the bad check statute required only that evidence show that defendant knew
that the check would not be paid. The magistrate also failed to view the evidence and the
12

reasonable inferences arising from that evidence most favorably to the prosecution. The
current bad check statute requires that the actor issue the check "knowing"—being
"reasonably certain"—that it will not be paid. Here, defendant and her husband had issued
hundreds of bad checks during the preceding two and one-half years, they were under
enormous financial pressure from numerous unpaid obligations, and at the time of
preliminary hearing they owed over $450,000. Additionally, there was undisputed testimony
that there was never enough money in the account to cover the check by thousands of dollars
and that all of defendant's bank accounts reviewed by a State investigator—twelve
accounts—were soon involuntarily closed. Nevertheless, defendant and her husband
repeatedly lulled their numerous victims, without results, with stories that they expected
substantial funds in the near future.

All of this evidence, viewed favorably to the

prosecution, provided sufficient probable cause to bind defendant over for issuing a bad
check.
ARGUMENT
THE MAGISTRATE ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO BIND OVER
DEFENDANT ON THE CHARGE THAT SHE ISSUED A BAD CHECK
TO MORRIS MURDOCK WHERE THE EVIDENCE AND ITS
INFERENCES SUPPORTED A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT
DEFENDANT KNEW IT WOULD NOT BE PAID
Defendant was charged with two counts of issuing a bad check (counts 1 and 2), two
counts of communications fraud (counts 3 and 4), and one count of pattern of unlawful
activity (count 5). R4-1. After all parties submitted memoranda, and after a hearing, the
magistrate dismissed all charges.

R139, 191-188.

13

The State does not dispute the

magistrate's dismissal of count 1 (issuing a bad check to Martinez and Horton), count 3
(devising a scheme to defraud the Fauxs), count 4 (devising a scheme to defraud the
Stonelys), and count 5 (pattern of unlawful activity). As explained below, however, the
reasonable inferences arising from the evidence established a "reasonable belief that
defendant committed all the elements of count 2, issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock.
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over on this charge should therefore be
reversed.
A. The Bindover Standard.
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a
preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^f
10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (additional
internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,437
(Utah 1998). Thus, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must. . . produce
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^f 15
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a
bindover is the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ^f 16. Under both
standards, the prosecution need only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id.
(Emphasis added).

14

In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant
committed each element of the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the prosecution." Id. at ^f 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 3, 26 P.3d 223
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution"). "[W]hen faced with
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave
those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (alteration in original). "It is not for the [magistrate] at a preliminary
hearing to accept the defendant's version of the facts over the legitimate inferences which
can be drawn from the [State's] evidence." People v. District Court of Colorado's
Seventeenth Judicial District, 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990) {en banc) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to alternative reasonable
inferences, the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the State's case. See
Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternate
inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause); see also Hawatmeh, 2001
UT 51, ^1 13 ("Although defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly
inferred from the evidence, there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and
the facts do not negate the reasonable inferences presented by the State"). In short, "'unless
the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue

15

which supports the [prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate should bind the defendant over for
trial." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983))
(brackets in original); accord State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ^f 10, 44 P.3d 730.
B. The State produced believable evidence that defendant
issued a bad check to Morris Murdock (count 2).
1. The magistrate confused the mens rea requirement for issuing
a bad check with the mens rea requirement for fraud.
Defendant was charged with issuing a bad check to Morris Murdock under UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-505 (1) (West 2004). R4-3. Under that section, a person is guilty of

issuing a bad check if: (1) the person "issues or passes a check . . . for the payment of
money"; (2) the person passes the check " for the purpose of obtaining from any person ..
. any .. . property, or other thing of value ..."; (3) the person knows it will not be paid by
the drawee"; and (4) "payment is refused by the drawee."
It was undisputed the defendant issued the check to Sharon Warner, Morris
Murdock's agent, for the purpose of obtaining eleven airline tickets to Hawaii and that the
check did not clear the Wallaces' account. Rl96:46-50. Therefore, the only issue was
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant knew the
$11,496.30 check to Morris Murdock would not be paid.
The magistrate, however, refused to bind over because the State did not show that
defendant intended to defraud Morris Murdock when she issued the bad check. This was
error.
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In dismissing the bad check charge, the magistrate noted that defendant had argued
that because the check was postdated, "it should only be regarded as a promise to pay in the
future," and thus not actionable under the bad check statute.7 See Memorandum Decision,
R150-141 at 147 (citing State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960, Utah 1953)) (Addendum C). The
magistrate also noted, however, that the statute did apply "if there was a misrepresentation
made at the time the check was written." Id. The magistrate then found "that the State failed
to present evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of
misrepresentation." Id.
The magistrate discussed its rationale for dismissal as follows:
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the
defendant wrote the checks with the knowledge that there would be sufficient
funds based upon the Wallaces' history of debt. However, there was ample
evidence at the preliminary hearing that the Defendants were expecting to
receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and there was no
evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant
does not carry the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the
large payout, but rather this burden rests solely upon the State to present some
evidence that the Defendant's [sic] were engaging in fraud by misrepresenting
the statement of expecting a substantial sum of mone> arriving from a business
deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces were not
relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds.
The State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of
receiving money was a misrepresentation and that the State can not meet its
burden by merely presenting evidence of insufficient funds and failure to pay.

7

In fact, the check was actually predated, one day before the transaction.
Rl 96:49. The State however does not dispute that both parties understood the check was
to be held for several days. R196:48-49. See State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah 565,100 P.2d 564,
566 (1940) (victim understood at the time check was given that there were insufficient funds to
cover it and that it was to be held for a few days until it would be good).
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R147-146 (emphasis added). The magistrate confused the mens rea requirement for issuing
with the mens rea requirement for fraud.
In 1953, when Bruce was issued, guilt for issuing a bad check required criminal
conduct "with intent to defraud."8
Section 76-6-505 (1), however, does not require an intent to defraud.9 Rather, "[t]he
element of 'knowledge5 of the overdraft is now sufficient to support a conviction." State v.
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983) (rejecting claim that the 1977 revision to the
statute intended to retain the element as part of the offense and noting that "[t]he omission
of the element in the revised statute logically can mean nothing but that the legislature's
purpose deliberately was to remove such intent as an element of the offense.")

8

Prior to 1973, the bad check statute provided as follows:

Any person who . .. wilfully, with intent to defraud, makes . . . or
delivers any check,.. . knowing at the time . . . that the maker . .. has not
sufficient funds in, or credit with said bank . . . for the payment of such
check,... is punishable . . . .
The making, . . . or delivering of such check, .. . shall be prima facie
evidence of intent to defraud.
UTAH CODE ANN.

76-20-11 (1953) (emphasis added). The complete statute is in

Addendum A.

9

In 1973, section 76-20-11 was repealed, and the bad check statute was reenacted
as section 76-6-505. 1973 Utah Laws 621. Although the section 76-6-505 has been
amended several times since 1973, subsection (1), under which defendant was charged,
has not.
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Here, the magistrate impermissably added the element offraudulentintent into the bad
check offense. The magistrate stated that the "burden rests solely upon the State to present
some evidence that the Defendant's [sic] were engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the
statement of expecting a substantial sum of money arriving from a business deal. R146. The
magistrate reinforced its mistaken focus when it stated "[t]he State must establish sufficient
evidence that the Wallaces were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to
provide the sufficient funds." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the magistrate believed
that the State was required to show that the Wallaces were deliberately lying about money
arriving to make the check good several days later. Finally, the magistrate's order granting
dismissal of the charges expressly relied on "the State's fail[ure] to present any evidence of
fraudulent intent when [defendant] instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the
check for a period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account." See Order,
R191-188 at 191-190 (emphasis added).

In sum, because the magistrate improperly

augmented the State's burden for bindover by requiring the State establish evidence of
defendant's fraudulent intent, an element not required by the bad check statute, the Court
should reverse the magistrate's dismissal of the bad check charge (count 2). Even assuming
that the magistrate's references to "fraudulent intent" are deemed to have been limited to
defendant's knowing misrepresentation that there would be soon be sufficient funds to cover
the check, it incorrectly concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of that
fact for bindover.
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2. The magistrate incorrectly assigned to the State the burden of disproving
defendant's putative defense when, instead, it should have viewed evidence
that defendant would reasonably have known that there would be
insufficient funds to cover the check most favorably to the prosecution.
On July 18, 2002, defendant made a check to Morris Murdock for $11,496.30.
R196:13-14.10 The check was drawn on the account of "Imi Kaimana Enterprises, LLC" at
FarWestBank. R196:13-14. The check was dated July 17,2002. R196:49. Defendanthad
told Ms. Warner earlier in the day, however, that presently there were not sufficient funds
in the account and asked Ms. Warner to hold the check until the following Tuesday, July 23.
R196:48. Later that day, defendant and her husband, George Wallace, delivered the check
to Ms. Warner. R196:49. When Ms. Warner called the bank on Tuesday, she was informed
that there were not sufficient funds to cover the check. Id. When she deposited the check
sometime later, it was returned for insufficient funds. Rl 96:50.
As stated above, to meet the bindover requirement, the State was only required to
present evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that defendant knew that the
$11,496.30 check to Morris Murdock would not be paid.
"A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-103(2) (West 2004).

10

There is no direct evidence that defendant signed the check. However, the
prosecutor's references that it was "her check" and that she was charged with issuing a
bad check are not disputed. Rl 18, 161.
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Here, the magistrate found that "there was ample evidence at the preliminary hearing
that the Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an
investment and there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation."
R147. The magistrate continued, "[t]he Defendant does not carry the burden at the
preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather this burden rests
solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's [sic] were engaging in
fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money arriving from
a business deal." R147-146.
The magistrate misapprehended the prosecution's burden at the bindover stage and
its duty to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence favorably to
the prosecution. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^J10. As the prosecutor pointed out, defendant proffered
no evidence that the Wallaces were expecting a large sum of money. See Motion to
Reconsider, R166-152 at 161. Rather, defendant's victims reported that she told them that
they were expecting money. Id. Given the magistrate's duty to view the evidence favorably
to the pro secution, the paucity of such evidence should have played no role in the
magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over.
In any case, there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant
would have been "reasonably certain," that there would not be enough money in the account
to cover the check to Morris Murdock only a few days later. Mr. O'Bryant, the State's
investigator, testified that there was never enough money in the Imi Kaimana Enterprises,
LLC account to cover the check "[b]y a large margin—[t]housands of dollars." R196:15.
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Evidence that the Wallaces were in extreme financial straits at the time defendant
delivered the check to Ms. Warner further supports that defendant would have been
reasonably certain that the check to Morris Murdock would not clear by Tuesday, July 23.
"The very kernel of the principle (either knowledge or intent) is that the fact of the uttering
[a forged check] tends, in one way or another, to show the defendant's knowledge at the time
in issue, either by the probable warning received, or by the improbability of innocent intent
in repeated instances', and the assumption throughout is that the bare fact of utterance shows
this." State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 P. 1065, 1066-67 (Utah 1924) (emphasis added).
Over the preceding two and one-half years, 254 checks issued by the Wallaces were
returned for insufficient funds. R196:9-10. See Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1083)
(noting that testimony that previously passed bad checks supported that the defendant was
reasonably certain that the check at issue would not clear, but that this evidence was not
sufficient to support conviction for theft by deception in light of contrary evidence); Lanos,
63 Utah 151, 223 P. at 1066-67 (evidence of the defendant's passing two uncharged forged
checks, even without knowledge that they were forged, was relevant to prove the defendant's
guilty knowledge that he passed a forged check in the instant case); Kelly v. State, 663 P.2d
967, 972 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (evidence of contemporaneously issued bad checks
admissible to prove intent or absence of mistake concerning charged check); People v.
Jackson, 748 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
Further supporting that defendant knew the check to Morris Murdock would not be
paid was defendant's contemporaneous issuance of two bad checks to Martinez and Horton.
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In defendant's immediate presence, she wrote one check to Mr. Martinez for $3,000 and
another one to Mr. Horton for $13,000. The checks were written on July 17, one day before
the bad check to Morris Murdock was written. R:R196:13-14,41,43. Although the checks
were written on a different account at Far West Bank, the Imi Kaimana Investment, LLC
account, "there was never anything close to $ 13,000 in that account either before or after that
check was written . . ." R196:11-12. That account was involuntarily closed less than a
month after the check to Morris Murdock was written. R196:12. Every one of the twelve
accounts of the Wallaces that Mr. O'Bryant investigated was involuntarily closed. R: 196:910. The Wallaces admitted that the State's "Restitution/Victim List," "fairly accurately]"
showed that they were indebted to at least twenty individuals or entities in the amount of
$457,379.79. R196:30-32; State's Ex. 3.
In addition to contemporaneously written bad checks and a recent history of hundreds
of bad checks, defendant could no longer make payments on the house she and George
Wallace purchased from the Stonely s at the time she delivered the check to Morris Murdock.
Defendant made no payments from May 2002 through November 28, 2002, when the
Wallaces deeded the house back to the Stonelys. State's Ex. 3, Jeanne Stonely's 1102
statement, "Legal and Financial Report - 8/1/96 — 11/06/02 and Ex. P, "Short Missed
Payments." In the preceding four and one-half years, the Wallaces missed or shorted
payments in about 40 months. Id. At the time of the bad check to Morris Murdock, the
Wallaces owed the Stonelys over $50,000. R: 100; State's Ex. 2, Ex. P.

Finally, Deborah

and George Wallace's constant litany of big deals coming to fruition and promises to pay
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their creditors "by Tuesday," when, in fact, the purported funds rarely materialized to support
their promises, is strong circumstantial evidence that defendant knew that by the time he
delivered the check to Morris Murdock, it would not be paid. Cf. Kollar v. State, 556 N.E.2d
936, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (conviction for theft by false pretenses supported by pattern
of repeated promises of delivery of goods to multiple victims, followed by lulling purchasers
with excuses for failure to perform long after the defendant should have been aware that his
business was failing); Baker v. State, 588 So.2d 945, 948 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (affirming
conviction for theft by deception based on intent to defraud on failure to perform promises
in similar instances and subsequent evasive conduct and delaying tactics).
Here, long after the date on which the b ad check to Morris Murdock would
purportedly clear, defendant repeatedly told Ms. Warner that a large amount of money was
coming in and that she should just hold off a few more days. R196:50-51. Using the same
refrain, George Wallace repeatedly put off Mr. Martinez and Mr. Horton for months with
claims that he was expecting a "big deal" to come through and that "[w]e should have your
money for you by this next Tuesday or Wednesday." R: 196:37. Similarly, defendant put off
the Stonelys for months with promises of performance, while she and George Wallace
repeatedly missed or sent short payments on the house for months and years afterward. See
State's Ex. 2, Ex. I (defendant's emails stating that results from projects she and her husbnd
were working on would yield results shortly). Similarly, the Wallaces put off Ms. Stone,
Tradewinds' booking agent, after defendant's check was returned for insufficient funds: "Just
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continual telephone conversations about how funds were being processed from their many
ventures and that we would be paid [and] to please be patient." State's Ex. 1 at p.l.
None of defendants' purported expectations produced any payments to their victims,
nor did any proceeds from their purported ventures protect his bank accounts from
involuntarily closures. In sum, in light of the hundreds of bad checks that defendant and her
husband wrote during the preceding two and one-half years, the enormity of their admitted
debt, and undisputed testimony that there was never enough money in the account to cover
the check "[b]y a large margin—[t]housands of dollars" (R196:15), there was substantial
evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant knew with "reasonable certainty" that
the check she delivered to Morris Murdock would not clear the following Tuesday.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over and dismissing the felony
information against defendant on a charge of issuing a bad check (count 2) should be
reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for trial on that
charge.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18,
\ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982).
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In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral arg
Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
- #

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this }±_ day of October, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

PENAL CODE

[1945]

76-20-11. Checks, drafts or orders against insufficient funds—Evidence*
—Any person who for himself or as the agent or representative of another or as an officer of a corporation, wilfully, with intent to defraud,
makes or draws or utters or delivers any check, or draft orjorder upon
any bank or depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation, « r the payment of money, knowing at the time of such'making, drawing, uttering
or delivering that the maker or drawer or the corporation has not sufficient funds in, or credit with said bank or depositary, or person, or
firm, or corporation, for the payment of such checks, draft or order, in
full upon its presentation, although no express representation is made
with reference thereto, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than 14
years.
The making, drawing, uttering or delivering of such check, draft or
order as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.
Where such check, draft or order is protested, on the ground of
insufficiency of funds or credit, the notice of protest thereof shall be
admissible as proof of presentation, nonpayment and protest and shall be
presumptive evidence of insufficiency of funds or credit with such bank
or depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation.
The word "credit" as used herein shall be construed to mean an
arrangement or understanding with the bank or depositary, or person, o*
firm or corporation, for the payment of such check, draft or order.
History: O. 1943, 103-18-11, enacted by
L. 1945, ch. 87, § 1.

C621]

Penal Code

11973]

ch. 196

Section 76-6-505. (1) Any person who issues or passes a check for
the payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of
value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing,
it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee
is guilty of issuing a bad check.
(2) For purposes of this section, a person who issues a check for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check
would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or series of checks made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of not more than
$100, such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or checks drawn in this state within a period not
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $100 but not more
than $1,000, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor. •
(c) If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000 but not
more than $2,500, such offense shall be a felony of the third degree.
(d). If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $2,500, such offense shall be a second degree felony.

CRIMINAL CODE

§ 76-2-103.

Definitions

A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 4.

§ 7 6 - 6 - 5 0 5 . Issuing a bad check or draft—Presumption
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this
state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less
than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds
$300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds
$1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds
$5,000, the offense is a second degree felony.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-505; Laws 1977, c. 91, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 92, § 1; Laws
1995, c. 291, § 16, eff. May 1, 1995.

RULES OF EVIDENCE

RULE 1102, RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations.
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence;
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary
examination;
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any
exhibit;
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records;
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer;
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense
which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance
with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed
verbatim which is:
(A) under oath or affirmation; or
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement
made therein is punishable.
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay evidence
is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the
hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if:
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
[Adopted effective April 1, 1999.]

ADDENDUM B

Fourih Judicial District C
ofUtah County, State of L>

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 031403946; 031403948
vs.
Date: November 30, 2004
GEORGE AND DEBORAH WALLACE,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Counts 1-5 of the Information apply to Defendant, Deborah Wallace.

2.

Counts 6-11 of the Information apply to Defendant, George Wallace.

3.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 1 with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, for
a check that was written to Don Horton in the amount of $13,000 and for a $3,000 check
written to Edward Martinez. These checks were written on July 17, 2002. Mrs. Wallace
told both Mr. Horton and Martinez that her account lacked sufficient funds and instmcted
them to wait a few days before cashing the checks, as she was expecting sufficient funds
to be deposited into her account. However, when the gentlemen attempted to cash the
checks, there was insufficient funds.

4.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 2, issuing a bad check, and Mr. Wallace, theft by
deception, for a check written by Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel in the amount
of approximately $11,000 on July 18, 2002. The check was dated July 17, 2002, and Mr.
Wallace asked the agent, Sharon Warner, to not cash the check for a few days because
there was not sufficient funds in the account that the check was drawn on, but that

sufficient funds were expected to arrive from a business deal. However, the sufficient
funds did not arrive and the check did not clear.
5.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 3 and Mr. Wallace in Count 8 for Communication
Fraud, which involves a transaction between Mrs. Wallace and Catryna Faux. Mrs. Faux
performed housekeeping services and Mrs. Wallace still owed her about $1,063 in back
wages. Mrs. Faux testified that while she lived in Springville, Utah she had loaned
money to Mrs. Wallace on three separate occasions. The first two loans were repaid, but
the third one, amounting to $1,129.32 was not repaid. Mrs. Faux and her husband then
voluntarily traveled with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace to Hawaii, with the promise of jobs.
While in Hawaii the Wallaces borrowed additional money from the Fauxs.

6.

In September 2002, the Wallaces persuaded the Fauxs to attend a NuSkin convention in
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Wallaces told the Fauxs that they would pay them $6,000
when they arrived at the convention, based upon monies the Wallaces were expected to
receive. When the Fauxs arrived in Utah, they learned the Wallaces did not receive the
funds and "that it was a big mess." Whereupon the Fauxs moved back to Utah, as they
could not afford to remain in Hawaii. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that
"I know [the Wallaces] felt bad about not getting the money, and [Mrs. Wallace], you
know, in good will, said, 'We'll pay you back for those expenses."' PLH Trans, at 67.

7.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 4 and Mr. Wallace in Count 10 for Communication
Fraud. These charges stem from a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. The
Wallaces and the Stonelys entered into a contract for the sale of the Stonelys' home.
However, the defendants became delinquent in payments between September of 1997 and
June of 2002. In addition, the defendants also failed to pay property taxes. The Wallaces
were delinquent in the amount of $57,714.40. As a result of the delinquency, the
Wallaces signed a warranty deed, deeding the property back to the Stonelys "in payment
of all monies owing." PLH Trans, at 75.

8.

Mrs. Wallace is charged with Count 5 and Mr. Wallace with Count 11, Pattern of
Unlawful Activity, to include all other creditors that were not repaid by the Wallaces.

9.

Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 6, theft by deception, for an agreement he entered into
with Mr. Horton. Mr. Horton loaned the defendant $10,000 to make an investment. The
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defendant was unable to repay Mr. Horton the principal or interest when the amount came
due.
10.

Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 9, issuing a bad check. However, the State fails to
provide the Court with sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge.

11.

The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was conducted on April 7, 2004, after which the
Court took the issue of binding over the charges under advisement and to allow counsel
to brief the issue.

12.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, whereupon the State filed a motion in
opposition. Oral Arguments were held on October 19, 2004.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is "ferreting out. . . groundless and improvident
prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 504 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 ( 2004). hi order to bind a defendant
over at a preliminary hearing, the Court must find that there is probable cause sufficient to
establish the "crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id.
(citations omitted). "In making a determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the
prosecution." Id 'The defendant should be bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim." Id, The State must present a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah
1995)(citation omitted).

I.

Count 1, issuing a bad check, is dismissed because the checks were not written for value.
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check for events arising out of

checks that were written to Mr. Horton and Mr. Martinez on July 17, 2002. To support a charge
of Issuing a Bad Check, the State must establish that the defendant drafted a check for payment
with the purpose of receiving something of value knowing that the check would not be honored
-3-

due to insufficient funds. The State supports its position based upon the insufficient funds.
However, the State must establish that the checks were written for exchange of value. Issuing a
check for exchange of value is an essential element that the State must satisfy. The State argued
that something of value was exchanged because the elimination of debt should be considered
value. This Court disagrees. The facts of the case clearly show that on July 17, 2002, when Mrs.
Wallace wrote the checks, neither Mr. Martinez or Horton were given any new value to the
defendants. See Howell Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). It was nothing more than a
promise to pay in the future, without adding new or additional terms to previous agreement that
arose from the July 2, 2001 transactions. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 is
granted.

II.

Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the
State fails to establish misrepresentation by Mrs, Wallace, nor does the State establish
actual deception by Mr. Wallace.
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 2, Issuing a Bad Check, and George Wallace is

charged with Count 7, Theft by Deception, for events arising out of checks that were written by
Mrs. Wallace to Moms Murdock Travel. The Defendant argues that because Murdock Travel
agreed to withhold depositing the check for a few days that the check falls out of the definition of
a check, which must be payable on demand, and that it should be regarded as only a promise to
pay in the future. The Defendant cites State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953) in support of her
position. In Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court stated that postdated checks did not fall under the
bad check statute, however, the statute applied if there was misrepresentation made at the time
the check was written. This Court finds that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of misrepresentation.
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the defendant wrote the
checks with the knowledge that there would be insufficient funds based upon the Wallaces'
history of debt. However, there was ample testimony at the preliminary hearing that the
Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and
there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant does

-4U

;

/ i. 1 r

not cany the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather
this burden rests solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's were
engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money
arriving from a business deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces
were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. The
State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of receiving money was a
misrepresentation and the State can not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of
insufficient funds and a failure to pay.
Moreover, as pertaining to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State is required to establish
some evidence that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that is false,
fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct
that is not true, or promises performances that he does not intend to preform. Here, the State has
failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact
that Morris Travel would be repaid. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Ms.
Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's wife and not the
Defendant. Therefore, since the State is unable to satisfy all elements of the charges, the
defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 7 is granted.

III.

COUNT 3 & 8, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State failed to establish
that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to defraud the Fauxs of at least $5,000.
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for

events arising out of dealings with the Fauxs. To bind over for a charge of Communication
Fraud, a second degree felony, the State must establish that the defendants devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud another of at least $5,000 or something other than monetary value, and that the
events occurred in Utah County, Utah. The State contends that the Fauxs were defrauded out of
$7,286.83. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that in Utah County the following
debts were made by Mrs. Wallace: $1,129.32 of which Deborah borrowed from Mrs. Faux to pay
for her son's rent-a-car, and for $1,063 in wages for Mrs. Faux's employment as a housekeeper in
Springville, Utah. However, based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the
-5»•
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remaining transactions all occurred in Hawaii and not in Utah County, Utah and therefore those
transactions can not be calculated in the total figure to establish communication fraud.
Therefore, since the monetary value that was accrued in Utah County, Utah does not exceed
$5,000 the State is unable to establish probable cause as to all elements of the charge.
In addition, this Court finds that the debt that accrued in Utah County, Utah does not
amount to communication fraud. Based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing,
it was established that on previous occasions that the defendants did repay money on previous
loans they owed the Fauxs, which is contrary to the State's position. Moreover, no testimony
was presented at the Preliminary Hearing to show that the Wallaces' expectation of funding was
fraudulent. Since intent to defraud is an essential element of Communication Fraud, and the
State failed to satisfy this element, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 3
and 8, Communication Fraud.

IV

COUNT 4 & 10, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State has failed to
establish that the delinquent mortgage and tax payments was an intent to defraud the
Stonelvs.
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for

events arising out of a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. To bindover a
communication fraud the State must satisfy its burden by presenting some evidence of a scheme
or artifice to defraud another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises
or material omissions. However, the State supports its position by claiming that delinquent
payments is sufficient to establish communication fraud and that the defendants were spending
money to finish the basement instead of paying their other debts. These assertions are not
sufficient to satisfy the State's burden. The State fails to present any evidence of a scheme or
artifice. Moreover, delinquent payments are not sufficient to establish probable cause of an
intent to defraud. Finally, this Court finds that the fact that the Stonelys executed and recorded,
through their attorney, a warranty deed expressly satisfying an> and all obligations owed by the
Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's position that the Wallaces intended to defraud
the Stonelys. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 10 is granted.
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V.

Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful activity, are dismissed because the Wallaces do not
constitute an enterprise, nor does their conduct constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as
defined by statute.
Both defendants are charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity. To bind over Pattern of

Unlawful Activity, the State must establish that probable cause exist that the Wallaces constitutes
an enterprise and of a pattern of unlawful activity. An ''enterprise" means any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as
well as licit entities." U.C.A. section 76-10-1602(1). The State contends that the Wallaces
constitute an enterprise under the statute, but the State fails to articulate how the Wallaces
constitute an enterprise, other than the mere fact that they are mamed to each. The State failed to
present any evidence or authority to establish that a mamed couple constitutes an enterprise as
defined by the statute, hi a recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals states that "[a]n 'association
in fact' enterprise 'is provided by evidence of an ongoing organization formal or informal, and by
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.'" State v. Bradshaw, 508
Utah.Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 2004)(citations omitted). An enterprise is a "continuing unit
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631
(Utah App. 1988)(stating that the individuals had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose
of making money with the sale of drugs). The State cites no authority suggesting that marriage
creates an enterprise. Courts have universally rejected attempts to extend the scope of
antiracketeering laws and to reject efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in
RICO clothing." Bradshaw, 508 Utah.Adv. Rep at 16. This Court finds that the mere fact that
the Wallaces are married does not constitute an enterprise. It is the conclusion of this Court that
it was not the legislative intent to include marriages as an enterprise within the scope of the
statute scheme to constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as contemplate in U.C.A. section 7610-1602(1).
Furthermore, the Wallaces pattern of debt does not constitute unlawful pattern of activity
as described by the statute. The statute requires at least three episodes of unlawful activity,
which episodes are not isolated, but are the same or similar. Such activities that are prohibited
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are theft by deception or communication fraud. However, as stated previously, this Court finds
that the conduct of the Wallaces do not amount to acts of either commercial fraud or theft by
deception. Moreover, this Court finds that the defendants did not use or invest the money they
borrowed in a proscribed manner, as required by the statute. The 'language of the statute is clear
that defendants] must 'use or invest5 the proceeds from the unlawful activity in the proscribed
manner, namely the 'acquisition,' 'establishment,' or 'operation of an 'enterprise.'" Id.; See
State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988)("[UPUAA} makes it a crime to use the profits
of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise."); and Accord State v.
Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("A [RICO} violation occurs not when the
defendant engages in the predicate acts, but only when he uses or invests the proceeds of that
activity in an enterprise.'")(citation omitted).
Therefore, this Court grants the Defendants motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 11, Pattern of
Unlawful Activity.

VI

COUNT 6, Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the State failed to show actual
deception by the defendant when he persuaded Mr. Horton to loan him $10,000.
Theft by deception requires that the State prove the defendant created or confirmed by

words or conduct a fact that is false, fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created
or confirmed by words or conduct that is not true, or promises performances that he does not
intend to preform. The State contends that Mr. Wallace committed a theft by deception by
entering into an agreement to have Mr. Horton make an investment of $10,000, without
intending to repay him. However, the only evidence the State presents to support its contention
is the defendant's failure to repay. The State did not provide any evidence regarding the nature
of the investment and whether the investment was fraudulent. There was no evidence presented
to establish whether there was either a fictitious investment project or whether the money was
actually invested but that the project failed to perform as had been expected by the Defendant.
The fact that the money was not repaid is insufficient to establish an intent to deceive; the State
must present some evidence that a "big deal" was not legitimately expected by the defendant and
that the lack of repayment was not a result of commercial misfortune. Furthermore, there was

-8-

00J

testimony presented that the agreement between the defendant and Mr. Horton took place
simultaneously when the defendant and Mr. Martinez entered into the identical agreement. Mr.
Martinez received full repayment of the loan's principal which supports the position that the
defendant possessed the intent to repay, rather than to deceive. In addition, there was evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing that there had been a history of paying debts to Mr.
Martinez.
The State failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false
impression of fact that Mr. Horton would be repaid. Not every unfilled promise is turned into
deception. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983). A lack of repayment is insufficient
to establish probable cause that the defendant intended to defraud either Mr. Horton or Mr.
Martinez. This Court finds that there lacks probable cause to bindover Count 6 and that this
charge is dismissed.

VII

The State fails to provide sufficient facts for Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check.
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the Defendant's motion, nor was it

discussed in oral arguments. Since this Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the
nature of this charge, Count 9 is dismissed.

CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented to the Court at the Preliminary Hearing; Oral Arguments
and Memorandums, this Court finds that the State has been unable to establish probable cause for
each and every element of the charges. Moreover, this Court finds that the State failed to meet its
burden to show that the defendants conduct raised to the level of theft and fraud, rather than mere
commercial misfortune. Therefore this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss all
counts. The Defendants are to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the
Court's signature.
On a final note, it appears, based upon the facts of this case and the arguments presented
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by the State, that the State is making the statement that there should be a policy to criminally
charge individuals who run into financial difficulties, are unable to pay debts, file for bankruptcy,
have foreclosed on their mortgage, or who fail to meet their contractual obligations, and that
these debtors should be subject to criminal sanctions, along with any potential civil actions. In
these situations, there are often a multitude of unpaid debts to various creditors, however, it is
clear that the criminal courts are not the proper avenue to deal with these situations, nor should
they be used to convert ordinary civil debt into criminal restitution.

DATED this

. day of November, 2004.

STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

CASENOS. 031403946, 031403948

GEORGE WALLACE, and DEBORAH
WALLACE,
Defendants.

JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN

These matters came before the Court for preliminary hearing on April 7, 2004.
Present were Dave Wayment appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Gunda Jarvis on behalf
of George Wallace ("George"), and Jennifer Gowans on behalf of Deborah Wallace
("Deborah"). The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to
brief issues relative to the bind-over. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on
November 30, 2004, wherein it found that all charges should be dismissed because the
State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing, to wit:
Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check: The State failed to present any evidence that
Deborah drafted a check for payment with the purpose of receiving something
of value, or that she did so knowing that the check would not be honored due to
insufficient funds.
Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception: Relative to
Count 2, the State failed to present any evidence of fraudulent intent when
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Deborah instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the check for a
period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account.
As to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State failed to establish any
evidence that George created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that was
false, or that he failed to correct a false impression that he created or confirmed
by words or conduct that was not true, or that he promised performance that he
did not intend to perform. Moreover, the evidence established that Ms. Warner
dealt exclusively with Deborah.
Counts 3 & 8, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, because the
monetary value that accrued in Utah was less than $5,000, the State is unable as
a matter of law to meet the value element of these charges. Further, the State
presented no evidence that the Defendants' communications were made with
any intent to defraud, or that the Wallaces engaged in a scheme or artifice. To
the contrary, Ms. Faux testified that she believed the Defendants acted in good
faith and were simply unable to meet their financial obligations due to
unforeseen economic hardship.
Counts 4 & 10, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, the State
has failed to establish any evidence of a scheme or artifice to defraud or to
obtain anything of value. Further, the undisputed fact that the Stonelys
executed and recorded a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all
obligations owed by the Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's
position that the Wallaces intended to defraud the Stonelys, or that the Wallaces
2
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engaged in a scheme or artifice, or that they received anything of value.
Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful Activity: The State has failed to establish
any evidence or cite to any authority that the Wallaces are an enterprise or that
their conduct constituted a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by statute.
The mere fact that the Wallaces are married is not sufficient to establish an
enterprise within the scope contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1).
Furthermore, the Wallaces' pattern of debt does not constitute a pattern of
unlawful activity as defined by the controlling statute; nor does it arise to the
level of criminal conduct, as previously noted herein. Moreover, the State has
completely failed to present any evidence that the defendants used or invested
the proceeds from the alleged illegal activity for the acquisition, establishment,
or operation of an enterprise.
Count 6, Theft by Deception: The State has failed to establish any evidence
that George had any intent to deceive Mr. Horton, or that George created,
confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact regarding repayment, or
that the failure to repay was anything more than commercial misfortune.
Rather, the evidence showed that George intended to repay the loan. The mere
lack of repayment is insufficient to establish probable cause as to the essential
element of intent to defraud.
Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check: This issue was not raised in either the State's
or the Defendant's motion, and was not discussed at oral arguments. The Court
was not given sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge.
3
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In summary, each of the State's creditor-witnesses testified that the Wallaces
were expecting a large sum of money with which to pa) all their debts. There was no
testimony or inference that this expectation was a misrepresentation. To the contrary, the
State's evidence includes that the Wallaces have a history of repaying their debts, they
signed a warranty deed returning residential property to the sellers after the Wallaces
made improvements, and that the Wallaces acted in good faith. None of the State's
witnesses testified that the Wallaces intended to defraud anyone, nor can the same be
inferred in light of the substantial evidence to the contrary. In short, this case represents
an improper attempt to use the criminal justice system as a means to collect a civil debt.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that all the charges in the Information
are hereby dismissed.
BY THE COURT this 31

day of January, 2005.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

DEBORAH WALLACE,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

SUPPLEMENTATION OF
RECORD CITATIONS TO
STATE'S OPENING BRIEF
No. 20050190-CA

:

The State of Utah, by and through Kenneth A. Bronston, Assistant Attorney General,
hereby supplements the State's opening brief with record citations, viz., page numbers
assigned to paginated exhibits supplemented to the record following the filing of the State's
opening brief, as follows:
6 3rd par.

... the Wallaces owed them more than $450,000. R138:8,10; State's Ex. 3,
R206-205.

9 1st par.

. . . but only the one for $301.24 cleared defendant's account. Rl38:43-44;
State's Ex. 4, Donald Horton's 1102 statement, R204-202.

9 3rd par.

... and interest then owed. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102
statement, Ex. A and P. R243-240. 209.

9 fn.3

. . . bearing on counts 4 and 10 (State's Ex. 2, R246-207)

10 2nd par.

. . . a deficit totaling $51,111.13. R100; State's Ex. 2, Jeanne Stonely's 1102
statement, R209.

10 1st par.

. . . by renting the estate. R138:72-73; State's Ex. 1, 1102 statement of
Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent R269, 266.

10 1st par.

. . . $8,000 amonth beginning July 1,2002. R138:15-16; State's Ex. 1, 1102
statement of Peggy Young, booking manager for Tradewinds, R266-265.

11 fn. 4

The 1102 statement of Peggy Stone, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1, R269247)

11 1st par.

. . . plus a late fee, on the estate. State's Ex. 1, R269.

11 1st par.

. . . That check did not clear. State's Ex. 1, R269.

11 1st par.

.. . another individual's credit card. State's Ex. 1, R269.

11 1st par.

. . . for $3,096.84 to partially cover the first month's rent. State's Ex. 1,
R269.
... was returned for insufficient funds. R138:15,17-19; State'sEx. 1, R211.

11 l st par.
12

. . . "Restitution/Victim List, was "fairly accurate." R138:30-32; State's Ex.
3, R206-205. The list compiled the Wallaces indebtedness to numerous
persons and entities, including victims of the charged offenses, totaling
$457,379.79. State's Ex. 3, R206-205.

23

delivered the check to Morris Murdock. State's Ex. 3, Jeanne Stonely's 1102
statement, "Legal and Financial Report - 8/1/96 — 11/06/02, R244 and Ex.
P, "Short Missed Payments," R209. In the preceding four and one-half years,
the Wallaces missed or shorted payments in about 40 months. Id. At the
time of the bad check to Morris Murdock, the Wallaces owed the Stonelys
over $50,000. R:100; State's Ex. 2, Ex. P, R209.

24 2nd par.

. . . payments on the house for months and years afterward. See State's
Ex. 2, Ex. I, R224-21.

25 1st par.

. . . we would be paid [and] to please be patient." State's Ex. 1 at p.l, R269.
2

DATED this 18th day of November, 2005

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Supplementation of
Record Citations to the State's Opening Brief, was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jennifer K.
Gowans, Fillmore Spencer, LLC, attorneys for defendant Provo, Utah 84604 this 18th day of
November, 2005.
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